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Abstract 
Airborne conflict management is an enabling 
capability for NASA’s Distributed Air-Ground 
Traffic Management (DAG-TM) concept.  DAG-
TM has the goal of significantly increasing capacity 
within the National Airspace System, while 
maintaining or improving safety.  Under DAG-TM, 
“autonomous” aircraft maintain separation from 
each other and from “managed” aircraft unequipped 
for autonomous flight.   
NASA Langley Research Center has 
developed the Autonomous Operations Planner 
(AOP), an onboard decision support system that 
provides airborne conflict management (ACM) and 
strategic flight planning support for autonomous 
aircraft pilots.  The AOP performs conflict 
detection, prevention, and resolution from nearby 
traffic aircraft and area hazards.  Traffic trajectory 
information is assumed to be provided by 
Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast 
(ADS-B).   
Reliable trajectory prediction is a key 
capability for providing effective ACM functions.  
Trajectory uncertainties due to environmental 
effects, differences in aircraft systems and 
performance, and unknown intent information lead 
to prediction errors that can adversely affect AOP 
performance.   
To accommodate these uncertainties, the AOP 
has been enhanced to create cross-track, vertical, 
and along-track buffers along the predicted 
trajectories of both ownship and traffic aircraft.  
These buffers will be structured based on prediction 
errors noted from previous simulations such as a 
recent Joint Experiment between NASA Ames and 
Langley Research Centers and from other outside 
studies.  Currently defined ADS-B parameters 
related to navigation capability, trajectory type, and 
path conformance will be used to support the 
algorithms that generate the buffers.  
Introduction 
The National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) is studying a new concept 
of operations for the National Airspace System 
known as Distributed Air-Ground Traffic 
Management (DAG-TM) [1].  This concept is 
designed to significantly improve capacity, while 
maintaining or improving safety.   
One component of DAG-TM, En Route Free 
Maneuvering, represents a paradigm shift between a 
centralized ground-based system to a distributed 
system.  Under this concept, flight crews of 
appropriately equipped “autonomous” aircraft fly 
under Autonomous Flight Rules (AFR).  These 
aircraft are able to choose their own route and 
altitude, subject to maintaining separation from all 
other aircraft.  Controllers continue to provide 
separation between “managed” aircraft unequipped 
for autonomous flight and traffic flow management 
services for all aircraft.  Managed aircraft fly under 
conventional Instrument Flight Rules (IFR).  Flow 
management is normally applied in the form of 
waypoint speed, altitude, and time constraints at a 
terminal area meter fix.  Inside the terminal area, 
AFR flights revert to IFR. 
Airborne Conflict Management (ACM) 
functions including conflict detection, prevention, 
and resolution are key enabling capabilities for 
DAG-TM.  A conflict is defined as a predicted loss 
of separation (LOS) between the ownship and 
another aircraft.  Conflict detection alerts pilots to 
the presence of a conflict, prevention alerts to a 
potential ownship maneuver that would cause a 
conflict if initiated, and resolution gives a 
recommended avoidance maneuver to resolve the 
conflict.   
All ACM functions compare trajectories from 
the ownship and nearby traffic aircraft.  Supporting 
information including state vector and intent are 
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 presumed to be broadcast over Automatic 
Dependent Surveillance Broadcast [2].  Various 
uncertainties are associated with all trajectories and 
must be properly managed by onboard systems.  
The ACM system should accurately predict the 
trajectories within the limits of the information 
provided and properly cope with regions of 
uncertainty.     
Because trajectory errors cannot be eliminated, 
an ACM system must be aware of their potential 
impact on any alerts or guidance provided to the 
pilot.  NASA Langley Research Center has 
developed the Autonomous Operations Planner 
(AOP) as a prototype avionics system for AFR 
pilots [3].  The AOP interacts with the Flight 
Management System (FMS) and other aircraft 
systems to provide necessary conflict management 
and strategic flight planning capabilities.  As part of 
these functions, a new AOP capability assesses 
features of both the ownship and traffic trajectories 
that influence the magnitude of along-path, lateral, 
and vertical uncertainties.  It applies an appropriate 
safety buffer that varies along each trajectory and is 
based on the local three-dimensional uncertainty.  
All ACM functions then work with this modified 
trajectory. 
AOP Conflict Management 
To accommodate different types of flight 
operations and a range of conflict scenarios, the 
AOP provides both tactical and strategic conflict 
management capabilities.  The tactical system 
works with the own aircraft’s state vector and any 
available traffic aircraft intent sent over ADS-B.  
The strategic system considers the ownship’s active 
four-dimensional trajectory and also uses available 
traffic intent.  These paths usually consist of the 
FMS flight plan and include multiple target states.  
Activation of the tactical or strategic systems are 
dependent upon the time to predicted separation 
loss and the ownship’s current operating flight 
mode [3].  
Tactical Conflict Management  
The tactical system is geared toward flight 
involving inner loop heading, speed, vertical speed, 
and altitude commands given by the pilot.  When 
flying in these modes, pilots have normally left the 
programmed flight plan.  Tactical control is often 
used for shorter term goals such as convective 
weather avoidance or simple maneuvers around 
traffic conflicts.  During flight in a tactical mode 
such as “Heading Select” or “Altitude Hold”, the 
AOP conflict management functions consider only 
the position and velocity of the ownship.  They 
consider the four dimensional intent-based 
trajectories of nearby traffic, if available [4].   
In addition to the current flight mode, the time 
to predicted separation loss also affects AOP choice 
of a tactical or strategic resolution.  Tactical conflict 
resolutions in the form of heading, vertical speed, 
and altitude commands are offered when this time is 
less than approximately three minutes.  Inside this 
point, there is little time for the pilot to consider and 
execute a flight plan amendment.   
Trajectory uncertainties for tactical control can 
include position and velocity vector inaccuracies 
[2].  Due to the shorter time horizon of tactical 
operations, however (currently defined to be within 
5 minutes), the AOP emphasizes trajectory 
uncertainty handling for its strategic system. 
Strategic Conflict Management 
A major anticipated benefit of DAG-TM En 
Route Free Maneuvering is the pilot’s ability to 
optimize his route and altitude without coordinating 
with air traffic control.  Outside the terminal area 
(where these operations occur), pilots are likely to 
use the FMS flight plan to control the aircraft.  If an 
airspace or traffic conflict occurs in this case, the 
AOP proposes a flight plan change that resolves all 
conflicts, continues to meet flow management 
constraints assigned by ATC, and considers pilot 
efficiency preferences.   
For all strategic conflict management 
functions, the AOP compares the four-dimensional 
command trajectory of both the ownship and traffic 
aircraft [4].  The command trajectory refers to the 
path the aircraft will fly if the pilot doesn’t change 
any automation modes or settings actively 
supporting aircraft guidance.  This path may include 
multiple flight mode transitions.  For example, an 
aircraft may be flying an FMS descent with a flight 
control panel altitude between the aircraft’s current 
altitude and the end of descent.  Its descent will be 
limited by the selected altitude [5].  In this case, the 
 vertical command trajectory consists of the FMS 
descent until the aircraft reaches the flight control 
panel altitude and then level flight at that altitude 
until the end of the prediction.   
Changes to the command trajectory normally 
result from a pilot input.  However, a non-
programmed mode transition may also occur that 
affects the command trajectory, such as reversion to 
speed priority on descent if the intended vertical 
path results in an over-speed condition.  These 
intent changes can affect conflict predictability.  In 
the former case, the intent may change as the pilot 
resets the flight control panel altitude during an 
FMS climb or descent.  In the latter, a change to 
speed priority will take the aircraft off the planned 
descent profile.  Despite these potential 
uncertainties, use of the command trajectory to 
represent aircraft intent was proposed by the FAA 
and Eurocontrol in a 2000 Technical Interchange 
Meeting [6] and is also supported by RTCA [2].   
In addition to pilot control actions or autoflight 
mode reversions that may affect the intent-based 
trajectory, several factors can lead to differences 
between an aircraft’s predicted trajectory and that 
actually flown.  In order to study the DAG-TM 
concept, as well as the performance of contributing 
prototype avionics systems, NASA Langley has 
developed the Airspace and Traffic Operations 
Simulation (ATOS) hosted by the Air Traffic 
Operations Lab [7].  This simulation consists of 12 
medium fidelity pilot workstations that incorporate 
the AOP.  Information is shared over a High Level 
Architecture between subject pilot, pseudo-pilot, 
and ground stations (the latter located outside the 
ATOL).  Within this architecture, AOP 
performance can be evaluated in the presence of 
several forms of trajectory uncertainty. 
Sources of Trajectory Uncertainty 
A recent study by Mondoloni and Bayraktutar 
identified several types of trajectory uncertainty [8].  
Categories include environmental effects, variations 
in aircraft performance, and incomplete intent 
information.  Those uncertainty types that are 
modeled within ATOS and therefore impact AOP 
conflict management performance are discussed 
below.  Performance is evaluated based on the 
comparison of the predicted trajectory (as derived 
from command trajectory elements broadcast over 
ADS-B) with the actual trajectory. 
     
Environmental 
ATOS allows entry of a horizontal wind field 
at three dimensional grid points.  This grid can also 
vary with time during the simulation.   
When an aircraft is flying on an FMS flight 
plan, open loop trajectory change points (TCPs) 
such as top of climb and end of descent are affected 
by the wind field.  If the pilot fails to enter the wind 
conditions into the FMS prior to a climb or descent 
or if the wind is different from that entered, the 
along track position or arrival time of these points 
will change from the original prediction.  Since 
pilots fly at constant Mach or calibrated airspeed 
(CAS) during cruise, a change in wind will affect 
the arrival time at subsequent waypoints. 
Aircraft Performance 
  The AOP uses a single aircraft performance 
model to re-construct the trajectories of traffic 
aircraft.  During experiments conducted with the 
ATOS, there are typically several different aircraft 
models flying within the simulation.  The Langley 
subject pilot and pseudo pilot aircraft models (the 
latter being developed by the National Aerospace 
Laboratory of the Netherlands [9]) have different 
characteristics.  A recent Joint Experiment with 
NASA Ames resulted in a third aircraft model when 
Ames aircraft were added to the simulation [10]. 
Significant variability in path construction and 
guidance features between aircraft types [11] can 
lead to trajectory prediction errors.  These 
differences can include turn anticipation at a 
waypoint, descent initiation near top of descent, and 
path construction between two waypoints 
containing speed and altitude constraints. 
Incomplete Intent Information  
Aircraft flying FMS descents within the ATOS 
typically broadcast one vertical TCP at the top of 
descent and another at the end of descent.  Lacking 
any information about the middle of descent (such 
as the planned descent speed or deceleration 
points), AOP makes a straight line assumption.  
 This path assumes constant groundspeed and 
constant flight path angle between the two points.   
Figure 1 shows a nominal FMS descent profile 
with a speed and altitude restriction at the end of 
descent (assumed to occur above the mandatory 250 
knot speed restriction below 10,000 ft).  A two 
point prediction is superimposed.  Assuming the 
descent and cruise Mach are the same, the aircraft 
begins its descent at the top of descent.  When the 
descent Mach equals the descent CAS, the aircraft 
tracks a constant CAS until reaching a deceleration 
point where the descent shallows prior to the end of 
descent.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Nominal FMS Descent Profile 
Compared with Two Point Prediction 
Path features such as a difference between 
cruise and descent Mach or a speed reduction to 
meet the 250 knot restriction may cause additional 
variation.  These differences can be on the order of 
hundreds of feet. 
AOP conflict prediction performance was 
analyzed for distinct cases that occurred during the 
Joint Experiment between Ames and Langley 
Research Centers.  The experiment provided a good 
platform for comparing differences between 
predicted and actual trajectories and the operational 
impact of those differences for aircraft operating in 
a DAG-TM environment. 
Joint Experiment  
Design 
The Joint Experiment between NASA Langley 
and Ames Research Centers evaluated air/ground 
coordination issues during DAG-TM en route and 
arrival operations.  It also served as a test platform 
for the AOP conflict management and flight 
planning functions.  Corresponding to the DAG-TM 
goal of substantially increasing traffic levels in a 
mixed equipage environment (autonomous and 
managed aircraft flying in the same airspace), the 
experiment included two primary factors: 
• Mixed Operations (comparison of mixture 
of autonomous and managed aircraft in 
same airspace vs. managed aircraft alone, 
at the same traffic level). 
• Scalability (addition of increasing levels of 
autonomous aircraft to level of managed 
aircraft occurring under current 
operations). 
Traffic scenarios were run at three different 
traffic levels (“L1,” “L2,” and “L3”), with the L1 
level repeated for the “all managed” and “mixed” 
autonomous/managed traffic conditions.  This 
design led to a total of four experimental 
conditions.  The L2 and L3 levels included the same 
number of managed aircraft as the L1 mixed 
condition, while adding autonomous aircraft.  The 
L1 level was set to a challenging level based on all-
managed operations.  En route autonomous aircraft 
were added at L2 and L3, with L3 representing 
about twice current day capacity in the sectors 
modeled.  The number of aircraft descending to the 
terminal area remained the same for all conditions.   
The Langley ATOL and Ames Airspace 
Operations Lab were connected for the experiment 
and operations at both labs were conducted 
simultaneously as part of an overall traffic 
environment.  Twelve subject pilots participated at 
Langley (each flying a pilot workstation equipped 
with AOP).  Five subject controllers and nine 
subject pilots participated at Ames.  Pseudo pilots 
monitored pre-programmed background aircraft 
added to achieve the desired traffic level.  Subject 
pilots flew four different traffic scenarios for each 
of the four conditions, using a within-subjects 
design.   
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Mach/CAS Transition 
Deceleration  
End of
Descent
Predicted Path  
Actual Path  
Altitude  
Distance  
 The experimental airspace modeled the Dallas 
Ft. Worth area and is shown in Figure 2.  Subject 
controllers staffed the Amarillo, Ardmore, and 
Wichita Falls High Sectors and the Bowie Low 
sector.  A pseudo controller handled each “ghost” 
sector and performed handoff duties to the subject 
controllers.  Aircraft flew in the ghost sectors, but 
no data were collected there.  Each subject pilot 
flew two overflights and two arrivals for each 
experimental condition.  Overflights crossed either 
the Amarillo or Ardmore High sectors.  For arriving 
aircraft, two streams began in level flight in 
Amarillo or Ardmore and both included a descent to 
cross the BAMBE meter fix at 250 knots and 
11,000 ft.  The subject controller used a scheduler 
to assign required times of arrival at BAMBE to 
each arriving aircraft.  The scenario ended for each 
subject pilot when he or she crossed the high 
altitude sector for overflights or the BAMBE fix for 
arrivals.  Controllers continued to work traffic until 
all subject pilots from Ames and Langley had 
finished. 
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addition, AFR pilots were not allowed
in a way that would cause a near-term conflict for 
another aircraft (defined to be within 4 minutes to 
predicted LOS).  To meet these responsibilities, 
pilots used the AOP conflict detection and 
prevention functions to recognize and prevent 
conflicts, respectively.  For the descent scenarios, 
the AOP integrated with the FMS to provide 
conflict resolutions that met the BAMBE meter fix 
constraints.  During en route scenarios, the AOP 
looked for minimum path changes to the flight plan. 
Because AFR pilots were solely responsible 
for resolving all traffic conflicts, reliable AOP 
conflict management performance was required to 
ensure separation.  A missed conflict detection 
would likely result in a separation violation because 
controllers were not notified of AFR/AFR conflicts.  
As a safety buffer, they were alerted to a near-term 
AFR/IFR conflict, but were not required to take 
action to resolve it.   
At the time the experiment took place, conflict 
prediction was based solely on a comparison 
between the predicted trajectories of the ownship 
and traffic aircraft.  Pilots were only notified of a 
conflict if the two aircraft were predicted to be 
within the minimum required separation between 
the current position and the look-ahead horizon (10 
min).  No capabilities existed to make a more 
conservative conflict assessment in regions of high 
uncertainty. 
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metrics were the occurrence of separation violations 
(subject pilot aircraft within 1000 ft and 5 NM of 
traffic) and the pilot’s ability to meet the required 
speed, altitude, and time restrictions at the terminal 
area meter fix.  The latter were only applicable to 
descending aircraft.  These results as well as other 
metrics related to DAG-TM concept feasibility are 
annotated separately [12]. 
Relative to AOP conflict management 
performance, comparisons were made between the 
predicted and actual trajectories.  In a few cases 
where a separation violation was attributed to a 
conflict prediction error, a detailed analysis was 
performed to determine the error category and 
likely cause.  Two such cases are described below.   
 AOP Conflict Prediction Case Studies 
In both cases described below, the ownship 
and intruder aircraft were predicted to maintain 
adequate separation.  Therefore, the pilot was not 
alerted to an impending conflict.  The actual 
trajectories differed from the predictions 
sufficiently to cause an LOS.  
Case 1 
In the first case, the ownship (a Langley 
subject pilot) was flying straight and level at Flight 
Level (FL) 330 after having previously initiated a 
lateral strategic resolution maneuver.  It was 
approaching its top of descent point. Traffic (an 
Ames pseudo-pilot) was flying straight and level at 
FL 320, and would cross underneath slightly before 
ownship’s top of descent.  Figure 3 superimposes 
the actual and predicted trajectories for both the 
ownship and traffic aircraft.  Two minute tick 
marks allow direct comparison between the two 
aircraft and between the lateral and vertical 
trajectories (top and bottom pane of Figure 3, 
respectively).  
As shown in Figure 3, the ownship “rounded 
the corner” at the top of descent even more than 
AOP anticipated and initiated its descent slightly 
before AOP predicted it would. This difference 
resulted in an LOS (highlighted) with ownship 
descending to within 1000 ft of the traffic before 
the required 5 nm of lateral separation was 
regained.   
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Figure 3. Case 1: Comparison of Actual and 
Predicted Trajectories 
Figure 4 shows the actual and predicted lateral 
and vertical separations between the two aircraft.  If 
the ownship had followed the AOP trajectory as 
predicted, the two aircraft would have had over 5 
nm of lateral separation before ownship initiated its 
descent and no LOS would have occurred. 
In this case, the trajectory prediction error can 
be traced to a discrepancy in the assumed behavior 
near the ownship’s top of descent.  After further 
study, it was determined that the AOP assumed the 
descent would commence precisely at the top of 
descent.  The ownship guidance algorithm 
smoothed this transition and called for the aircraft 
to start its descent prior to the top of descent point 
provided to the AOP.  This top of descent ‘round-
off’ in the guidance algorithm had previously been 
designed to be consistent with a particular FMS 
type.  Even if the AOP trajectory predictor were 
tweaked to accommodate this nuance, it would 
likely not capture the transition behavior of another 
FMS aboard a different aircraft. 
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Figure 4. Case 1: Comparison of Actual and 
Predicted Separation 
Case 2 
In the second case, the ownship (a Langley 
subject pilot) had previously initiated a lateral 
strategic resolution maneuver for a different 
conflict.  At the time of the separation loss, it was 
flying straight and level at FL 330. Traffic (an 
Ames pseudo pilot) descended out of FL 380 and 
was predicted to cross ownship’s altitude with 
greater than the required lateral separation. 
However, the traffic flight path was closer to 
ownship than predicted. These effects resulted in an 
LOS, with traffic passing within 5 nm of ownship 
while descending through its altitude.  Figure 5 
superimposes the actual and predicted trajectories 
for both aircraft. 
In this case, the LOS was attributed to a speed 
discrepancy and a difference in the way the top of 
descent was defined by the two aircraft.  The source 
of the speed discrepancy is still under investigation. 
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Figure 5. Case 2: Comparison of Actual and 
Predicted Trajectories 
 
Concerning the top of descent, it was later 
determined that the guidance algorithm for the 
traffic aircraft called for it to fly slightly over the 
top of descent, then gradually intercept the profile 
from above.  This behavior is different, but no less 
correct, than that of the descending aircraft in Case 
1.  In the former case, the top of descent resembled 
a fly-by waypoint, whereas it was similar to a fly-
over waypoint in the latter.  Two different FMS 
systems and guidance algorithms yielded these 
consequential trajectory prediction errors.    
Figure 6 shows the actual and predicted lateral 
and vertical separations between the two aircraft.  If 
the aircraft speed discrepancy had not occurred, the 
difference in top of descent behavior would only 
have resulted in a higher descent relative to the 
prediction.  If this had been the only prediction 
error, an LOS would not have occurred, because the 
lateral separation would never have gone below the 
minimum required distance.  Because the traffic 
aircraft was faster than expected, it was closer to 
ownship when the former passed behind and 
underneath the latter.   
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Figure 6. Case 2: Comparison of Actual and 
Predicted Separation 
Although the LOS in this case can be 
attributed to the along-path prediction error, the 
vertical prediction is worth noting because such 
differences can lead to LOS events, as occurred in 
Case 1.  In addition, the Mondoloni and Bayraktutar 
study determined that top of descent placement has 
a significant impact on the accuracy of the predicted 
vertical trajectory [8]. 
These two cases represent only a small subset 
of potential variation between predicted and actual 
trajectories.  It would be impractical to model the 
precise flight path techniques of all flight 
management systems currently in operation [11].  
Even for a given aircraft, the tracking performance 
is not guaranteed to be consistent [13]. 
Although some improvements to the fidelity of 
the AOP trajectory generator will be made as a 
result of this experiment, the development of 
trajectory uncertainty-based buffers are seen as the 
primary factor towards mitigating prediction error.     
Trajectory Buffers 
AOP capability has recently been expanded to 
add dynamic buffers to the predicted trajectories of 
both ownship and traffic aircraft.  These buffers 
account for the varying uncertainty that occurs in 
three-dimensional space along a predicted path.  
The buffers allow AOP to represent predicted 
trajectories as three-dimensional regions of airspace 
instead of simple lines and curved segments as 
occurred in previous versions. 
Buffers along a predicted path can be assigned 
locally using a trajectory-relative coordinate 
system.  The axes include cross-track (normal to the 
path in the horizontal plane), vertical, and along-
path (used to represent time uncertainty).  
Buffers are assigned at progressive points 
along a trajectory, with linear growth or shrink rates 
describing the rates of change between points.  
When assembling the traffic aircraft trajectory, 
AOP may generate intermediate points in between 
the received TCPs.  These points often capture 
details of a trajectory change such as the start and 
end of turn or the transition region near top of 
descent.  For the ownship, AOP uses internal 
performance models and communications with its 
FMS.  It then uses the same criteria for assigning 
buffers as those used for traffic aircraft. 
After adding the buffers, each trajectory can be 
represented as a three-dimensional tube through 
space, the center of which is the aircraft’s predicted 
path.  The trajectories have an associated time range 
at each position along the path.  AOP’s conflict 
detection routines compare the buffer-enhanced 
trajectories as four-dimensional objects to 
determine regions of potential conflict.  When 
making this comparison, the entire trajectory region 
is given equal weight.  This approach differs from 
other conflict probes that determine conflict 
probability [14].   
AOP first compares the two trajectories to see 
whether their vertical separation is ever less than 
the minimum required.  If so, these regions are 
evaluated to determine if there is a time overlap.  
Any regions of time overlap are further compared to 
see whether they lie within the minimum required 
lateral separation.  Remaining segments are marked 
as potential conflicts and the pilots are notified 
accordingly. 
The buffers have been designed as a way to 
represent the types of discrepancies observed in 
simulation between the actual and predicted 
 trajectories.  They focus on accounting for 
differences due to environmental conditions and 
aircraft dynamics, performance, and guidance 
techniques.  Trajectory errors associated with 
potential intent changes after the predictions are 
made are not currently accommodated. 
Cross-track Buffers 
While on an FMS-path, cross-track buffers can 
be used to accommodate uncertainty near a 
waypoint involving a course change.  Potential 
errors can include turn anticipation differences or 
modeling the radius of turn.  The latter varies for 
fly-by and fly-over turns.  These buffers can also 
represent tracking error between waypoints.   
Figure 7 shows an example of how these 
buffers can be applied, in this case to account for 
errors in modeling the radius of a turn at a 
waypoint. The predicted path is shown as a heavy 
line, with a thinner line outlining the region swept 
by the cross-track buffer along each segment. In 
this example, the straight-flight segments before 
and after the turn have relatively narrow cross-track 
buffers; the buffer grows during the first segment of 
the turn, remains wide during the segment in the 
middle of the turn, and shrinks again in the last 
segment of the turn. 
 
 
Figure 7. Cross-track Buffers at a Waypoint 
Turn 
When extended to cover non-FMS paths, 
cross-track buffers will be able to account for lateral 
uncertainty while an airplane is flying in an air-
referenced mode (such as Heading Hold).  In this 
situation, the aircraft’s ground track is subject to 
changing wind fields.   
Vertical Buffers 
Vertical buffers are used to represent altitude 
uncertainty along a path.  They are particularly 
helpful in addressing the complex and variable 
trajectories associated with FMS climbs and 
descents.  For instance, they can be used to provide 
vertical tolerance for the multiple inflection points 
shown in Figure 1.  If an unexpected tailwind is 
encountered during a descent and the pilot does not 
add sufficient drag, the aircraft may leave the path 
in order to avoid an overspeed condition.   
Figure 8 shows how the altitude buffer might 
account for errors in modeling the vertical profile of 
an FMS descent without intermediate altitude 
constraints. The vertical buffer is relatively small 
during level flight. Approaching the top of descent, 
the buffer below the path grows in order to protect 
against an early descent or the “rounding off” effect 
prior to the top of descent.  As the aircraft descends, 
the buffer above the path gradually grows until they 
are large both above and below. At the end of 
descent, the buffer below the path shrinks to reflect 
the assumption that the aircraft will level off at the 
target altitude.    
altitude
distance  
Figure 8. Vertical Buffers during an FMS 
Descent without Intermediate Altitude 
Constraints 
 
If the descent has an intermediate waypoint 
altitude constraint, the buffers can be locally 
reduced to reflect higher vertical path certainty 
when crossing the waypoint.  A comparable process 
can be applied for subsequent descent segments.   
Along-Path Buffers 
Along-path buffers are used to represent time 
uncertainty along the path.  This component 
assumes the aircraft follows its predicted path 
 exactly but arrives at each point earlier or later than 
expected.   
This buffer need not grow uniformly on all 
segments.  For example, the error may grow much 
faster during a descent segment than while in level 
flight.  The along-path buffer may shrink as the 
aircraft approaches a meter fix with a required time 
of arrival on the assumption that the aircraft will 
comply with the restriction.  
Application to Previous Cases 
The differences between the actual and 
predicted trajectories in the two cases described 
previously can be related to this coordinate system.  
In Case 1 (Figures 3-4), there is good lateral and 
along-track agreement.  The top of descent “round-
off” can be classified as a pure vertical error.   
In Case 2, there is generally good cross-track 
agreement with the predicted trajectory.  One 
exception is the area near the traffic aircraft turn 
that wasn’t modeled by the existing version of 
AOP.  (Turn modeling has since been added).  
There are both vertical and along-path errors for 
this trajectory.  The aircraft was faster than 
expected (along-path error), but also began its 
descent later than expected (vertical error).  In 
addition, some inflection points followed by this 
aircraft were not modeled by AOP.  When 
converted back to a common time reference, the 
along-path error impacts both the aircraft’s lateral 
and vertical predicted position.  The differences 
between the predicted and actual separation are the 
cumulative effect of the cross-track and vertical 
components of the along-path error (at a given time) 
with the independent cross-track and vertical errors.  
The lateral separation error results from the aircraft 
being further along the path (and therefore closer to 
ownship) than expected.  The top of descent occurs 
later than expected, but the aircraft also traveled 
faster than expected.  These two effects negate each 
other and the resulting vertical error is minimal 
during the LOS region.  
Application of Trajectory Uncertainty 
Elements Available over ADS-B 
Although the architecture to generate buffers 
has been implemented within AOP, the algorithms 
to create them have not yet been developed.  These 
algorithms will be designed to use trajectory 
elements available for broadcast over ADS-B [2].   
The RTCA Minimum Aviation System 
Performance Standards (MASPS) for ADS-B 
provides industry standards for intent broadcast [2].  
The latest version of this document (RTCA/DO-
242A) has defined several additional parameters in 
the mode status, state vector, target state, and 
trajectory change reports that can be used to assess 
trajectory uncertainty.    
Mode Status and State Vector Reports 
The mode status and state vector reports 
provide information on an aircraft’s operational 
capabilities and dynamic state, respectively.  
Parameters describing the transmitting aircraft’s 
navigation accuracy and integrity are contained 
within these reports.  These parameters indicate the 
capability of an aircraft’s navigation sensors to 
accurately determine its position and velocity 
(accuracy) and to know when its position exceeds a 
containment radius (integrity). 
AOP could use this information to apply cross-
track and vertical buffers to the current flight 
segment.  A sudden drop in integrity may require 
the buffers to expand significantly.  Buffer 
adjustments due to accuracy changes would likely 
be smaller. 
Target State Report 
The target state report contains the target 
altitude and target heading or target track angle of 
the transmitting aircraft.  During straight and level 
flight, these elements represent the current 
commanded states.  For a climb, descent, or turn, 
they are the level-off altitude or roll-out heading or 
track angle commanded by the guidance system. 
Horizontal and vertical target source indicators 
state whether the respective targets come from the 
flight control panel, FMS, or are the current state 
values commanded by the autopilot.  This 
information could be used by AOP to assess the 
potential for future intent changes.  In general, 
flight control panel settings represent tactical 
operations that may be more subject to change than 
the programmed flight plan.   
 Two flags are reserved for the transmitting 
aircraft’s assessment of its conformance to the 
broadcast horizontal and vertical paths.  A non-
conforming aircraft would require larger buffers 
than a conforming one under similar circumstances. 
Trajectory Change Report 
When an aircraft is flying using strategic 
control (having multiple future target states), it may 
broadcast a series of messages that provide 
information on its predicted position, altitude, and 
time at upcoming TCPs.  As part of this message 
set, it sends the horizontal and vertical type of each 
broadcast trajectory change point.  These 
parameters give information on the waypoint type 
and the preceding flight segment.   
The ADS-B MASPS currently defines five 
horizontal and five vertical change types.  
Horizontal types include direct to fix and course or 
track to fix legs (terminated at the fix or concluding 
with a fly-by turn) and radius to fix turns.  Vertical 
types distinguish between open loop points such as 
top of climb and descent and those with constraints 
that the aircraft is trying to meet (such as a target 
altitude or waypoint altitude constraint).   
Trajectory change types give AOP valuable 
information needed to assess the uncertainty at 
various locations along the path.  Trajectory 
changes occurring at less certain locations will 
necessarily have larger buffers.  Knowledge of a top 
of descent point and the occurrence of any 
successive altitude constraints will enable AOP to 
develop descent buffers comparable to Figure 8. 
This report has also reserved space for several 
conformance assessments made by the transmitting 
aircraft.  An “Able/Unable Altitude Constraint” 
indicates whether the aircraft predicts it will be able 
to make its next waypoint altitude crossing 
restriction.  This parameter helps mitigate the effect 
of sending misleading information about an 
aircraft’s altitude at a waypoint.  With this 
information, the AOP can structure the vertical 
buffer around this point accordingly.  Two 
additional flags provide notification of estimated 
horizontal and vertical conformance.  These values 
are expected to assess the validity of other predicted 
trajectory elements broadcasted by that aircraft. 
Use of these parameters that are already 
defined industry standards should give AOP 
significant insight into defining the buffers for each 
nearby aircraft. 
Conclusions 
Feasibility assessments of advanced 
operational concepts such as DAG-TM will need to 
incorporate reliable airborne conflict management 
capabilities.  Trajectory prediction is a key element 
of all of these capabilities.   
Environmental effects, variations in aircraft 
performance and avionics system design, and lack 
of necessary intent information make it difficult to 
precisely predict each aircraft’s trajectory.  Until the 
National Airspace System becomes entirely reliant 
on Required Navigation Performance [15], these 
uncertainties will continue to exist.   
A recent experiment has validated some of 
these uncertainty types and led to the creation of a 
trajectory uncertainty-based buffer system that 
becomes a characteristic of both the ownship and 
traffic aircraft predicted trajectories.  Algorithms 
for creating these buffers will rely heavily on 
industry-specified ADS-B parameters that give 
information on navigation capabilities, trajectory 
types, and expected path conformance. 
Current AOP development work will 
concentrate on developing and refining these 
algorithms.  Guidance from industry documents and 
identification of additional trajectory error cases 
from previous simulations will help drive the design 
process.  One focused area of testing will assess the 
acceptability of false alarms created by expanding 
the predicted trajectory space for each aircraft.  This 
area can be investigated through both follow-on 
human-in-the-loop experiments and with batch 
studies using the ATOS.   
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